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JUDICIAL ROLES IN NONJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 
NUNO GAROUPA
 
TOM GINSBURG 
ABSTRACT 
 Judges perform nonjudicial functions in many contexts. Most 
jurisdictions regulate these functions in multiple ways, by statute and by 
custom. We provide a theory of judicial demand and judicial supply for 
nonjudicial functions. By teasing out the determinants of judicial 
involvement in nonjudicial functions, we show the potential market 
failures and the need for regulation. We suggest that some limitations on 
the judicial exercise of nonjudicial functions seem justified. However, 
these limits might vary across jurisdictions depending on institutional and 
contextual factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We all know that the job of judges is to decide cases. Yet in many 
jurisdictions, judges also engage in multiple nonjudicial functions ranging 
from serving on law commissions, playing management roles, serving as 
public intellectuals, and even serving as interim executives. In a notable 
recent example, in the midst of a serious political and economic turmoil, 
the President of the Greek Supreme Administrative Court was appointed 
to be the interim Prime Minister.
1
 Justices have also served as acting 
presidents in Bolivia,
2
 Bangladesh,
3
 and Pakistan.
4
 One of the most 
significant constitutional crises in Brazilian history in October 1945 was 
resolved when the incumbent president was forced to resign while the 
Chief Justice was appointed as acting president.
5 
Are there any limits to judicial engagement in nonjudicial functions? 
Evidently the distinction between a judicial and a nonjudicial function is in 
itself complicated and convoluted.
6
 Case law has struggled to establish 
clear legal doctrines that offer a concise definition of a judicial function.
7
 
Impartiality, non-partisanship, and adjudication seem to be associated with 
 
 
 1. See Helena Smith, Greece‟s Interim Government Sworn in Before Fresh Election, GUARDIAN 
(May 16, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/16/greece-interim-government-sworn-in.  
 2. MARITES DAÑGUILAN VITUG, SHADOW OF DOUBT: PROBING THE SUPREME COURT 185 
(2010) (describing resignation of Bolivian president and appointment of Chief Justice as caretaker).  
 3. Former Presidents: Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, THE BANGABHABAN: THE PRESIDENT 
HOUSE OF BANGLADESH, http://www.bangabhaban.gov.bd/sayeed.html (last visited June 27. 2013). 
 4. The President: Previous Presidents, THE PRESIDENT: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN, 
http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=2&sel=4&pId=9 (last visited June 
27, 2013). 
 5. President Getúlio Vargas lost popular support for his authoritarian government and was 
forced to resign in October 1945. He was replaced by the Chief Justice José Linhares as acting 
president from October 1945 to January 1946. José Linhares, PORTAL BRAZIL, http://www.brasil 
.gov.br/linhadotempo/epocas/1945/jose-linhares (last visited June 27, 2013). 
 6. For example, under Australian law, judges play a judicial function when they address a 
dispute to be resolved by application of law in order to establish facts and a binding resolution 
accepted by parties. See Patrick Emerton & H. P. Lee, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in 
Australia, in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 403 (H. P. Lee ed., 2011). 
 7. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 passim (1989). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374704 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2013] JUDICIAL ROLES IN NONJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 757 
 
 
 
 
a judicial function.
8
 However, this conceptualization leaves an enormous 
gray area of functions that fundamentally are also adjudicative in nature 
and where judges are welcome due to their perceived independence and 
impartiality. For example, when judges are involved in private arbitration, 
is this a judicial function or not? The answer to this question is all but 
clear.
9 
The involvement of judges in nonjudicial functions also raises 
significant questions concerning the separation of powers doctrine.
10
 In 
fact, when judges take an important role outside of the judicial branch of 
government, they could be interfering directly with other branches as well 
as undermining the independence of the judiciary by endorsing 
extrajudicial adjudication or effectively undermining judicial review, for 
example. Additionally, nonjudicial functions could seriously compromise 
the impartiality of the judges in question. Furthermore, judicial 
participation in extrajudicial roles raises questions concerning the extent to 
which immunity privileges enjoyed by judges extend to nonjudicial 
functions.
11 
Not surprisingly, most jurisdictions regulate judicial involvement in 
nonjudicial functions. In the United States, the Code of Judicial Conduct 
allows some involvement (mostly related to legal activities, education, and 
charitable work) and prohibits others.
12
 Participation in government 
commissions and public hearings is usually the most controversial.
13
 Other 
jurisdictions, such as South Africa, have developed a specific 
incompatibility test to decide on possible nonjudicial functions.
14
 Yet there 
are also jurisdictions that have very few formal restrictions.
15
 Most 
 
 
 8. See generally id.; see also Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 (Austl.) (showing same 
point in the context of Australian law). 
 9. For example, New Zealand law has struggled with the meaning of tribunal until it was 
clarified in 2008. See Geoffrey Palmer, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in New Zealand, in 
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 452.  
 10. See Emerton & Lee, supra note 6. 
 11. In the United Kingdom, it has been clarified that judicial immunity applies only to judicial 
functions. See Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the United Kingdom, 
in JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 493.  
 12. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the United States, in 
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 512.  
 13. See id. 
 14. The incompatibility test was conceived after the Heath case when a High Court judge was 
appointed to a special investigation unit in 2001. Later the Judicial Service Commission Amendment 
Act 2008 was passed, which opened the way for further limitations on nonjudicial functions in the 
future. See Cora Hoexter, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in South Africa, in JUDICIARIES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 474.  
 15. For example, in Canada there are no significant constitutional constraints and only some 
minor statutory limitations under the Federal Judges Act of 1985. See Patrick Monahan & Byron 
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jurisdictions make a sharp difference between nonjudicial functions during 
tenure and post-tenure, with less intensive restrictions for the latter. In the 
words of the United States Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 
―[t]he ultimate inquiry remains whether a particular extrajudicial 
assignment undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch.‖16 
Absent significant statutory limitations, Canada and Australia have 
seen the development of the persona designata doctrine to regulate 
judicial participation in activities outside of the judicial branch of 
government. Perceived to be based on the doctrine of separation of 
powers, the goal is to undermine possible uses of judicial power outside of 
judicial functions.
17 
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider a judicial function an 
activity exercised by a judge inside the courtroom whereas by nonjudicial 
role we understand an activity exercised by a judge outside of the 
courtroom.
18
 Thus, the phenomenon recently characterized as the 
judicialization of public policy is usually achieved through formal court 
decisions, and hence is considered a judicial function within our analysis.
19
 
We recognize that there is some relationship between judicialization and 
nonjudicial roles in the sense that an infinite judicialization would 
inevitably eliminate nonjudicial roles as we understand them. However, by 
clearly distinguishing nonjudicial functions from other well-known 
phenomena, we provide for a better understanding of judicial behavior. 
Based on our theory of judicial reputation,
20
 we provide an explanation 
for why judges might be involved in nonjudicial functions. Notice that 
 
 
Shaw, The Impact of Extra-Judicial Service on the Canadian Judiciary: The Need for Reform, in 
JUDICIARIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 428. 
 16. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989). 
 17. See Emerton & Lee, supra note 6. The landmark cases are Drake v Minister of State for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 (Austl.), which questioned the appointment of a 
judge of the Federal Court of Australia to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and Hilton v Wells 
(1985) 157 CLR 57 (Austl.), which challenged a particular statute that allowed tapping by a warrant 
issued by a judge of certain specific courts, therefore raising questions concerning the distinction 
between ―judge‖ and ―court‖. Later Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 (Austl.), clarified the extent 
to which a function exercised by a judge is within persona designata. In Wilson v Minister for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 (Austl.), the High Court of Australia 
decided that a judge of the Federal Court could not be involved with preparing a particular report in 
relation to a public policy issue that demanded taking sides. 
 18. This is consistent with the Oxford English Dictionary which defines ―extrajudicial‖ as 
―[l]ying outside the proceedings in court.‖ OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 613 (2d ed. 1989). 
 19. On judicialization, see ALEC STONE SWEET & MARTIN SHAPIRO, ON LAW, POLITICS AND 
JUDICIALIZATION (2003). 
 20. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspectives from 
Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451 (2009); see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom 
Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the Judiciary, 4 J. OF COMP. L. 226 (2010); 
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judicial involvement in nonjudicial functions requires two explanations. 
First, judges have to be willing to perform such functions voluntarily, 
meaning that they must enjoy some benefits generated within nonjudicial 
tasks—the supply side. Second, other political and social relevant actors 
must desire judicial participation. Judicial participation in nonjudicial 
functions must yield certain payoffs to the relevant actors who select 
them—the demand side. We contend that both parties are motivated by 
reputation concerns; the judges wish to enhance their reputations, while 
other actors seek to draw on the reputation of the judiciary for impartiality 
and integrity. However, given that nonjudicial functions impose some 
costs in terms of collective reputation on the judiciary, some limitations 
are likely to be appropriate. In fact, we contend that potential market 
failures justify some form of regulation in this context. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes possible 
nonjudicial functions and the degree to which we expect them to be 
performed by judges. Part II develops a theory of judicial participation in 
nonjudicial functions. Part III concludes the Article. 
I. NONJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 
We can consider a continuum of nonjudicial functions in terms of 
being more or less similar to judicial functions. At one end of the 
spectrum, there are nonjudicial functions that can be seen as quasi-judicial 
in nature or seemingly judicial functions. Next we move to nonjudicial 
functions that benefit from judicial expertise or are related to courts and 
the legal system more generally. We also have nonjudicial functions that 
simply reflect community engagement. Finally, we have nonjudicial 
functions attached to the other two branches of government: legislative 
and executive. We also add business activities at the end of the list. In 
particular, we suggest the following framework:  
 (i)  Seemingly judicial functions: private arbitration, serving in 
tribunals as a mediator or in ad-hoc tribunals on restorative justice; 
(ii) Quasi-judicial functions: auxiliary functions such as electoral 
courts, deciding presidential powers, supervising political parties; 
(iii) Nonjudicial functions related to judicial functions: 
management of courts, serving in judicial council or other 
 
 
see also Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Party and 
Judicial Politics, 28 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 539 (2012). 
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commissions related to the court system or to judicial selection, 
retention, promotion, or disciplinary action; 
(iv)  Nonjudicial functions that are adjudicative in nature: chairing 
inquiries (royal commissions in the United Kingdom or in Australia, 
public hearings in the United States), special prosecutors, 
specialized investigations on corruption or terrorism, adjudicating 
impeachment of political actors; 
(v)  Nonjudicial functions that promote law: teaching and writing, 
working in judicial associations; 
(vi)  Social and community activities: involvement with nonprofit 
activities, participation in nonjudicial associations; 
(vii) Seemingly legislative functions: participation in law making 
commissions or working groups, serving on electoral boundaries 
commissions, supervising constitutional amendments; 
(viii) Seemingly executive functions: chairing administrative 
agencies (usually crime prevention related); serving as ambassadors 
or executive officers; 
(ix) Full legislative functions: legislator; 
(x) Full executive functions: member of the administration, 
serving as ambassador; and 
(xi) Business activities: involvement with for-profit activities, 
including lawyering and serving on corporate boards or 
directorships. 
These nonjudicial functions are not equivalent in nature. Arguments 
that certain activities benefit from judicial skills and independence might 
apply to the top of the list, but they are very unclear when we consider the 
bottom of the list. Similarly, arguments against judicial involvement in 
nonjudicial functions are apparently stronger for those at the bottom than 
at the top of the list. Not surprisingly, most jurisdictions are permissive 
with seemingly judicial or quasi-judicial functions but regulate more 
extensively any judicial involvement in legislative and executive 
functions.  
Business activities might benefit from judicial knowledge and human 
capital, in particular if the activities are law-related, but they expropriate 
from the entire judiciary its collective investment on reputation and 
prestige. They also undermine judicial impartiality and raise considerable 
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concerns in relation to professional conflicts of interest. It is not surprising 
that most jurisdictions prohibit such activities. 
II. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL ROLES IN NONJUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 
A. Supply Side 
Judges perform nonjudicial functions because they want to, but it is 
unclear why this is the case. Multiple reasons might explain judicial 
willingness to accept such a workload; these reasons are the determinants 
of the supply side. It could merely be a question of remuneration, either 
because the nonjudicial functions pay more or because they generate rents 
to be recouped in the future. Monetary payoffs, immediate or deferred, 
would be a good reason to opt for nonjudicial functions. A second possible 
set of reasons is related to enhancing individual prestige or reputation. 
Nonjudicial functions could provide better or new opportunities for 
individual judges to become more popular with relevant audiences. 
Nonjudicial functions could also reduce individual workload if they are 
less demanding in terms of hours or intensity of work, though nonjudicial 
functions might increase leisure opportunities. Finally, a third possible 
argument would be political and social influence. An individual judge with 
a particular ideological or social agenda could see a nonjudicial function 
as instrumental in promoting such agenda. 
Let us begin with our theory of reputation.
21
 We argue elsewhere that 
judges need a good reputation in order to accomplish their tasks. 
Furthermore, reputation requires team production; it has both an individual 
and collective component. A judge’s reputation contributes to that of the 
judiciary as a whole, but also depends on that collective reputation. We 
analyze how different sets of legal institutions are organized to emphasize 
the individual or collective investment in reputation. 
A judge taking on nonjudicial functions must compare the benefit to 
the potential cost. Nonjudicial functions might generate two significant 
costs. First, the judicial aura of impartiality and independence could be 
compromised by a nonjudicial function. As the U.S. Supreme Court said 
in Mistretta v. United States, ―[t]he legitimacy of the Judicial Branch 
ultimately depends upon its reputation for impartiality and non-
partisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political 
 
 
 21. See Garoupa & Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Party and Judicial 
Politics, supra note 20. 
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branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action.‖22 An 
erosion of judicial prestige and reputation, or even political compromise, 
in the future might be a significant risk both in terms of monetary and 
nonmonetary payoffs. Second, nonjudicial functions could preempt or 
undermine further judicial advancement in terms of career goals and 
promotion to higher courts, depending on the response of others to a 
judge’s actions.  
At the same time, judges may benefit from engaging in nonjudicial 
functions. One benefit is diversification of markets in which reputation is 
built. A judge who works entirely within the judiciary may be less well 
known outside of it and may want to diversify sources of reputation 
building. This may only make sense once a certain amount of internal 
reputational capital has been built. Furthermore, some judges may have 
particular skills, such as writing books and magazine articles. These 
judges may receive more marginal payoff to reputation-building by 
engaging in extrajudicial activities, at least up to a certain point. The 
existence of multiple markets for reputation building may enhance the 
overall prestige of the judiciary, given the range of judicial skills and 
personalities. 
The balance between anticipated benefits and expected costs will 
determine the extent to which an individual judge might accept a 
nonjudicial function. It is likely that the profile of benefits and costs for 
the same nonjudicial function varies among individual judges. The 
possibility of nonjudicial functions induces a selection effect. Certain 
types of individuals will be more prone to seek nonjudicial appointments 
than others. For example, consider the standard distinction between career 
and recognition judiciaries.
23
 Nonjudicial functions are likely to appeal 
more to recognition judiciaries for whom external audiences are more 
important than to career judges who are usually more focused on internal 
incentives. The potential costs of nonjudicial functions are also plausibly 
more significant when judicial selection and promotion is totally 
depoliticized and there is a well-structured career. The reason is that 
contamination by nonjudicial issues is likely to be more costly in a career 
judiciary than in a recognition judiciary given the institutional design. An 
immediate prediction would be that the role of nonjudicial functions will 
be more visible in recognition judiciaries than in career judiciaries, an 
observation that seems fairly consistent with the evidence. 
 
 
 22. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1988). 
 23. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Reputation Versus 
Legal Tradition, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411 (2011). 
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There are also significant moral hazard implications. The existence of 
nonjudicial functions is likely to distort or influence the incentives for 
judicial performance. To the extent that nonjudicial functions are 
generated or created by certain external audiences, individual judges might 
be more willing to appeal to such audiences. In some ways, this  
willingness could enhance judicial independence if judicial independence 
is instrumental to get these outside opportunities. In other ways, it could 
undermine judicial independence if partiality or partisanship is important 
to benefit from nonjudicial payoffs.  
Another plausible effect that nonjudicial payoffs could have is an 
adverse selection effect at entry level. Certain individuals might be more 
interested in a judicial career or appointment if nonjudicial functions are 
available. This could be problematic if it induces individuals to perceive a 
judicial appointment as merely instrumental to achieve a nonjudicial 
function. If the skills and attributes of judicial and nonjudicial functions 
are aligned, such effect is not very relevant. However, if the skills and 
attributes of a nonjudicial function conflict with those of a judicial 
function, individuals with the ―wrong‖ skill sets might seek judicial 
appointments. 
Shifts in the supply function will respond to changes in the balance of 
benefits and costs. For example, a continuous erosion of judicial monetary 
payoffs (because salaries are not increased) might see an increase in 
willingness to serve on nonjudicial functions. Fewer opportunities to 
receive promotions in the judicial career could also expand the supply 
curve. At the same time, excessive political polarization in nonjudicial 
functions is likely to diminish the supply curve as judges may become 
cautious about surrendering their prestige. The perception that nonjudicial 
functions might increase the likelihood of being expelled from the 
judiciary could have a significant chilling effect.
24
 
B. Demand Side 
We turn now to explanations for why certain groups or other branches 
of government might want judges to perform nonjudicial functions. The 
most immediate explanation is judicial skills and human capital. Certain 
tasks or jobs benefit from specialized skills or accumulated human capital 
particular to the judiciary. Therefore, unsurprisingly, judges are recruited 
 
 
 24. See, e.g., Raphael Minder, Spanish Judge Is Acquitted of Abusing His Authority, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/world/europe/prominent-
spanish-judge-cleared-of-abusing-powers.html. 
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to perform such nonjudicial functions. The examples relate to law, 
adjudication, interpretation, review, and even fact finding. 
If in some cases there is a genuine demand for judicial independence 
and impartiality, in other cases recruiting judges allows political actors to 
free ride on such convenient prestige. One example is using judges to lead 
politically sensitive inquiries or involving them in consultations for new 
legislation.
25
 Judicial participation in these nonjudicial functions might be 
beneficial given judicial human capital, but it also gives credibility or 
legitimizes a particular, potentially politicized outcome. Certain tasks 
performed by judges will be regarded in better consideration than if 
performed by politicians or other actors.  
There are collective costs of using judges to perform nonjudicial 
functions, however. The most serious cost is eroding judicial prestige, 
which could undermine judicial independence and separation of powers in 
the future.
26
 Another potential cost is the creation of alternative methods of 
adjudication that will inevitably compete with and possibly undermine the 
public system of adjudication.  
The general quality of institutions might determine shifts in the demand 
curve. In a system of generally poor institutions but with a good judiciary, 
we expect demand to be high and judicial involvement with nonjudicial 
functions to be more frequent. Where the judiciary is poor but other 
institutions good, demand will likely be low. 
A generalized loss of prestige by the political elites usually induces the 
demand curve to expand; more judicial involvement in nonjudicial 
functions is expected. We thus see politicians turning to judges at times of 
crisis to restore integrity to the system. On the other hand, excessively 
controversial judicial decisions could see the demand curve reduced in 
following periods.  
C. Potential Market Failures 
Having explained demand and supply curves for judicial involvement 
with nonjudicial functions, we can easily derive an equilibrium in which 
 
 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 48–52 (judges in royal commissions); see also J.B. Coyne, 
Judges and Royal Commissions, 37 CAN. L. TIMES 416 (1917) (describing early criticism of the 
practice). 
 26. For example, simple participation in constitutional conventions could change judicial 
preferences. See Edward N. Beiser, Jay S. Goodman, & Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., Judicial Role in a 
Nonjudicial Setting: Some Empirical Manifestations and Consequences, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 571 
(1971). Notice, however, that in this empirical study there was a serious selection effect since judges 
participating in those conventions had a political past. 
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judges will serve in nonjudicial functions in response to demand and 
supply determinants. There are good reasons to suspect that such 
equilibrium is not efficient because there are potential market failures. The 
most immediate is that the demand-side costs might be externalized and 
therefore not actually borne by those who seek judges in nonjudicial 
functions. 
Rationally we should say that judicial involvement with nonjudicial 
functions would be appropriate when the benefits outweigh the costs. The 
critical issue is that such benefits and costs are not symmetrically 
distributed across the population of interested parties. In many occasions, 
the benefit is concentrated in a particular political or social actor who has 
the power to appoint a judge to a nonjudicial function. Yet the cost is 
disseminated, if not borne heavily by the judiciary at large. Those who 
bear such costs might not be in a position to effectively oppose judicial 
involvement with nonjudicial functions. 
The unbalanced distribution of benefits and costs might justify 
regulation of judicial involvement in nonjudicial functions as a pre-
commitment mechanism to avoid opportunism by those who benefit. 
Inevitably this regulation has to be effective and sufficient to avoid 
conflicts of interpretation that could impose significant costs on the 
judiciary if the courts are required to adjudicate cases where they have a 
direct interest. Another possible solution is self-regulation by the judiciary. 
However, it is unclear if the interests of the judiciary are always aligned 
with those of the community at large.  
Not all nonjudicial functions have the same balance of potential costs 
and benefits. In fact, those that are more similar to judicial functions in 
nature are likely to maximize the net benefit for both judges and the 
relevant actors. Therefore, most legal systems are more permissive in 
terms of allowing quasi-judicial functions even if under some particular 
contexts such as a leave of absence without remuneration.
27
 As we go 
down the list, not only is it less likely that there will be an aggregate net 
benefit, but also conflicts of interest across actors emerge. Unsurprisingly, 
most legal systems prohibit such nonjudicial functions.
28
 Some even limit 
such functions after judges retire by imposing some time lag between 
leaving the bench and performing such nonjudicial functions.
29
 
 
 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra text accompanying note 131 (Chinese judges restricted from serving as lawyers for 
two years after retirement). 
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Another possible interpretation of this problem is to consider the nature 
of judicial independence and prestige as a public good among judges. 
Judges contribute to creating the public good, which forms a collective 
stock of reputational capital. But once built, there is a danger that it will be 
over-used and dissipated in nonjudicial functions that may benefit only a 
particular group of political actors. The public good nature requires some 
form of regulatory intervention to avoid excessive dissipation.  
A second potential market failure is the possibility of supply-induced 
demand. The judiciary could engage in strategic development of a 
reputation for independence and impartiality to induce additional demand 
for nonjudicial functions. This is a risky strategy since judicial decisions 
would be merely instrumental in order to achieve a longer-term goal 
unrelated to judicial functions. Furthermore, this strategy could be 
perceived as an expropriation strategy. The external benefits created by an 
independent judiciary are to be appropriated by individual judges seeking 
nonjudicial functions. Such expropriation is problematic in terms of 
efficient incentives and adequate distribution of payoffs. It seems 
appropriate to limit the possibility for supply-induced demand. Self-
regulation by the judiciary would not be an efficient mechanism since it 
could easily be captured to promote such supply-induced demand. 
Regulation by an external body or by statutory intervention seems 
advisable. 
Another related failure concerns the different market structures in 
judicial and nonjudicial functions. Judges have a monopoly on judicial 
functions, with the exclusive ability to engage in them. However, when it 
comes to nonjudicial functions, judges inevitably compete with other 
groups or professions. One possible consequence is that judges could use 
their monopoly rents obtained in judicial functions to promote their 
involvement in nonjudicial functions. One might think of this in economic 
terms as exercising a form of dumping against competing groups. Judges 
might shape adjudication and judge-made law to promote their reputation 
with relevant audiences and undermine possible competition for 
nonjudicial functions. For example, imagine a judicial decision requiring 
certain forms of investigative commission have judicial membership. 
These strategies are more costly when they promote the interests of the 
judiciary, but not those of society. Regulation might be necessary to 
restrict judicial ability to exploit these monopoly rents. In this context, it is 
also unlikely that self-regulation by the judiciary would be enough since, 
precisely due to monopoly power, there is little pressure within the 
judiciary to curtail their monopoly rents. However, regulation by a third 
party should also be carefully designed because competing groups might 
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lobby for excessive limitations so to avoid the competition of judges for 
nonjudicial functions.  
III. DISCUSSION OF EXAMPLES 
A. United States 
Judges in the United States, at both federal and state level, engage in a 
range of nonjudicial functions. This has been the topic of public debate, 
academic commentary, and official hearings.
30
 The very first Chief Justice, 
John Jay, was given ex officio roles  serving on a debt commission and 
inspecting the mint.
31
 He later ran for Governor of New York, and 
eventually resigned the Court to take that position.
32
 Chief Justice Jay was 
also sent to England to negotiate the treaty that bears his name.
33
 Although 
there has been less explicit involvement in public offices in more recent 
times, some have asserted that particular justices have political 
ambitions.
34
 And there has, by some accounts, been an increase in judges 
writing commentaries and giving speeches.
35
 
Nonjudicial functions are regulated by judicial codes of conduct, found 
in virtually every state. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
includes as Canon 3 a requirement that ―[a] judge shall conduct the 
judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of 
conflict with the obligations of judicial office.‖36 The rules include 
relatively strict prohibitions against judicial engagement in nonjudicial 
functions.
37
 For example, Rule 3.4 requires that ―[a] judge shall not accept 
 
 
 30. Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 136 (1969). 
 31. Leslie B Dubeck, Understanding “Judicial Lockjaw”: The Debate Over Extrajudicial 
Activity, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 569, 589 (2007). 
 32. Id. at 590. 
 33. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and Great Britain 
(Jay Treaty), U.S.–U.K., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; see generally SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S 
TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (1923). 
 34. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 267 (1982) (arguing that Frankfurter 
believed William Douglas had presidential ambitions); Peter Alan Bell, Extrajudicial Activity of 
Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1970). 
 35. RICHARD POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY IN DECLINE 364 (2003) (discussing 
judges as public intellectuals). 
 36. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 (2011), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/model_code
_ of_judicial_conduct_canon_3.html. 
 37. Dubeck, supra note 31, at 584 (including more commentaries in last seventy years); see id. at 
587 (including more speeches). 
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appointment to a governmental committee, board, commission, or other 
governmental position, unless it is one that concerns the law, the legal 
system, or the administration of justice.‖38 Typically, judges may speak, 
write, lecture, teach, and participate in other professional activities on 
legal and nonlegal subject matters.
39
 Judges may sit on professional and 
nonprofit boards, but are to limit their involvement in organizations that 
might be engaged in judicial proceedings.
40
 On occasion, states discipline 
judges for such involvement.
41
 
The issue has raised particular attention with regard to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, whose justices have engaged in frequent speech-giving on 
various topics of public import.
42
 The extent of this activity has, by some 
accounts, increased since the days in which Justice Frankfurter referred to 
the need for judicial self-restraint as a case of ―judicial lockjaw‖.43 The 
standard analysis cautions about the effect on judicial independence from 
judicial speech-giving, book-writing, and appearances at public events.
44
 
The same issues arise with regard to other nonjudicial functions, such as 
serving on commissions or government bodies. The U.S. Supreme Court 
itself considered the issue in Mistretta v. United States, quoted above, 
which considered the constitutionality of a judge serving on the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission.
45
 It was alleged that, as a rulemaking body, the 
Sentencing Commission involved administrative rather than judicial 
power.
46
 The Court found that the activity did not violate the separation of 
powers.
47
 In short, the U.S. approach tends to limit judicial involvement 
through codes of ethics, and has over the years shifted in the direction of 
limited judicial involvement relative to some other jurisdictions.  
 
 
 38. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2011), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2011_mcjc_rule3_4.authcheckdam
.pdf. 
 39. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 4(B) (2009), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf. 
 40. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 4(C)(3)(c) (2009), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/ 
documents/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdfd. 
 41. See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Nonofficial Conduct: A Survey and 
Critique of the Law, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 238–41 (1980) (listing types of conduct for which 
judges have been disciplined). 
 42. Dubeck, supra note 31, at 571 n.8 (discussing debate). 
 43. Felix Frankfurter, Personal Ambitions of Judges: Should a Judge “Think Beyond the 
Judicial‖?, 34 A.B.A. J. 656, 658 (1948). 
 44. Dubeck, supra note 31, at 572 (defining extrajudicial conduct to include partisan activities, 
ex officio activities, academic activities and public speeches). 
 45. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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B. United Kingdom 
Judges in the United Kingdom have a long tradition of leading 
commissions of inquiry in matters of public importance, including most 
recently an inquiry into the role of the press and police in the Rupert 
Murdoch phone-hacking scandal.
48
 The role of judges in extrajudicial roles 
garnered a good deal of public attention in the case of Ex Parte Pinochet, 
when it was learned that one of the judges in the case, Lord Hoffman, had 
been a director of Amnesty International while hearing the case.
49
 A 
notable recent case involved an inquiry into the death of David Butler, a 
former U.N. Weapons Inspector.
50
 This and other prominent cases led to a 
debate about the use of judges to chair public inquiries into matters of 
political controversy.
51
 The Government Department of Constitutional 
Affairs subsequently produced a Consultation Paper on "Effective 
Inquiries.‖52 This reported that there had been 30 major inquiries since 
1990, costing an estimated £300 million. It concluded that it can be 
appropriate for judges to chair inquiries because ―[t]he judiciary has a 
great deal of experience in analysing evidence, determining facts and 
reaching conclusions, albeit in an adversarial rather than inquisitorial 
context. The judiciary also has a long tradition of independence from 
politics, and judges are widely accepted to be free from any party political 
bias.‖53 The report seems to double down on judicial leadership, as it 
recommends the expansion of statutory powers for inquiries to include 
powers to compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents, 
as well as other quasi-judicial processes.
54
 Other cases of judges becoming 
involved in nonjudicial functions include a recent case in which a private 
company appointed a sitting judge to inquire into its own financial 
malpractice.
55 
 
 
 48. THE LEVENSON INQUIRY, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (last visited June 27, 2013). 
 49. Warren Hoge, Pinochet Lawyers Challenge Judge‟s Impartiality, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998, 
at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/16/world/pinochet-lawyers-challenge-judge-s-
impartiality.html. 
 50. THE HUTTON INQUIRY, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http:// 
www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
 51. Tim Buley, Judges Chairing Public Inquiries: Observations on DCA Effective Inquiries, 9 
JUD. REV. 293 (2004). 
 52. GR. BRIT. DEP’T OF CONST. AFF., EFFECTIVE INQUIRIES: A CONSULTATION PAPER 
PRODUCED BY THE DEP’T OF CONST. AFF. (2004). 
 53. Id. ¶ 46. 
 54. See id., Summary and Request for Views (including a list of powers for possible future 
legislation: the taking of evidence, cross-examination, legal representations, oaths, and other quasi-
judicial procedures). 
 55. Jonathan Russell, Olympus Appoints High Court Judge to Head „Improper Payments‟ Probe 
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C. Israel 
Like other common law jurisdictions, judges in Israel routinely lead 
commissions of inquiry. High profile examples include the Agranat 
Commission on the Yom Kippur War, the Kahan Commission, which 
investigated the conduct of the 1982 Lebanon war, and a recent 
commission to inquire into the flotilla incident.
56 
D. Canada 
Canada also regularly relies on judges to participate in commissions of 
inquiry.
57
 On occasion, such activities have led to controversy. In 2003, 
retired Supreme Court Justice John Gomery was named to lead an inquiry 
into allegations of corruption and mismanagement in a federal sponsorship 
program, and to formulate positive recommendations. The ultimate report, 
which implicated Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, led to significant 
controversy and was characterized as overly engaged in partisan activity. 
When Chrétien engaged in legal action to clear his name, the Federal 
Court ultimately quashed the finding of the inquiry.
58 
In another case, controversy erupted over Chief Justice Beverley 
McLachlin's involvement in the awarding of the Order of Canada to a 
doctor who performed abortions.
59
 Yet such controversies have not 
reduced the practice. It is particularly common for retired judges to play 
this role, as illustrated by a recent appointment to head an inquiry into so-
called ―queue-jumping‖ in the public health system in Alberta.60 
 
 
Panel, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 1, 2011, 5:25 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/media 
technologyandtelecoms/electronics/8863139/Olympus-appoints-high-court-judge-to-head-improper-pay 
ments-probe-panel.html. 
 56. Agranat Commission, KNESSET OF ISRAEL WEBSITE, http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/ 
agranat_eng.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013); Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events at 
the Refugee Camps in Beirut [Kahan Commission], ISRAELI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook6/pages/104%20report%20of%20th
e%20commission%20of%20inquiry%20into%20the%20e.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2013); CNN 
Wire Staff, Israel Names Head of Commission for Flotilla Inquiry, CNN: WORLD (June 13, 2012), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-13/world/israel.flotilla.inquiry_1_gaza-strip-israeli-policy-israeli-raid? 
_s=PM:WORLD. 
 57. Adam M. Dodek, Judicial Independence as a Public Policy Instrument, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN CONTEXT 295 (Adam M. Dodek & Lorne Sossin eds., 2010). 
 58. Tonda MacCharles, Gomery Was Biased in Report, Judge Rules, TORONTO STAR, June 27, 
2008, at A1, available at http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/450179.  
 59. Canwest News Service, Chief Justice Sheds Light on Morgentaler‟s Order of Canada 
Appointment, MONTREAL GAZETTE (Aug. 16, 2008), http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/ 
story.html?id=7d8564bb-eca3-4404-9d6b-f96c66b5416c. 
 60. Canadian Press, Retired Judge to Head Alberta Queue-Jumping Health Inquiry, CBC NEWS 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/story/2012/03/05/calgary-health-inquiry-
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E. Australia 
Judges in Australia have a long tradition of engaging in a number of 
non-judicial functions, including sitting on the Law Reform 
Commission,
61
 the Australian Competition Tribunal,
62
 and taking on 
various executive tasks—at least three members of the senior judiciary 
have served as Ambassadors.
63
 Judges regularly serve as leaders of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which is an administrative body.
64
 And 
recently, the Chief Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court was 
appointed chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
65 
This practice has prompted a nuanced jurisprudence and some good 
academic commentary, including a recent contribution from Chief Justice 
R. S. French.
66
 The courts in at least one state have taken the position that 
sitting judges should not be able to sit on extrajudicial government bodies, 
as it might undermine public confidence.
67
 There has also been discussion 
over whether the proper role of judges might vary with conditions, such as 
wartime or emergency.
68 
Australian law defines judicial power as involving a dispute to be 
resolved by a binding decision applying specified legal criteria to 
ascertained facts.
69
 In cases refining this test, Australian courts have found 
that judicial engagement in some inquiry-type functions is incompatible 
with the judicial role.
70
 One distinction in Australian law is between 
nonjudicial tasks conferred upon the office of the judge and those 
 
 
head-announced.html.  
 61. Commissioners, AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, http://www.alrc.gov.au/about/ 
commissioners (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). 
 62. Members of the Australian Competition Tribunal, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION TRIBUNAL, 
http://www.competitiontribunal.gov.au/about/members (last modified Jan. 11, 2012). 
 63. Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 403. 
 64. Id. 
 65. James Spiegelman Named as New ABC chairman, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 8, 
2012), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/james-spigelman-named-as-new-abc-chairman 
-20120308-1ulfw.html.  
 66. R. S. French, Executive Toys—Judges and Non-judicial Functions, 19 J. JUD. ADMIN. 5 
(2009); see generally Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 403. Some of the practices analyzed by Chief 
Justice French are, in our view, standard functions of executive oversight, such as issuing search 
warrants and orders for preventative detention. See Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 (Austl.) 
(judges participating in issuing covert warrants to authorize interception of communications). 
 67. Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 414 (describing position of Victorian judiciary in 1923). 
 68. Fiona Wheeler, Parachuting In: War and Extra-Judicial Activity by High Court Judges, 38 
FED. L. REV. 485 (2010). 
 69. Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Austl.). See Emerton & 
Lee, supra note 6, at 405–06. 
 70. Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 
(Austl.).  
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conferred upon an individual judge in her personal capacity, known as the 
so-called persona designata exception. Courts tend to ask whether the 
conferral of the function in a personal capacity will undermine the 
performance of judicial functions or the appearance of independence.
71 
For example, in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs, the Court considered whether a sitting federal judge could 
be nominated, in his personal capacity, to provide a report to the 
government in accordance with a scheme in which outsiders were called 
on to evaluate Aboriginal claims for preservation of particular lands. It 
found the scheme violated the separation of powers, as it involved the 
judge in a function that was essentially political in character.
72 
F. South Africa 
South African judges sometimes lead commissions of inquiry.
73
 In one 
notable case, the South African Special Investigating Units and Special 
Tribunals Act (SIU Act) empowered the president to set up special units, 
including judges, to investigate corruption.
74
 In South African Association 
of Personal Injury Lawyers v. Heath, the Constitutional Court found that 
the functions conferred on a judge by the SIU Act compromised the 
separation of the courts from other arms of government.
75
 Citing several 
Australian cases, the Court argued that it blurred the line between the 
courts and other branches of government, undermining the independence 
of the judiciary.  
G. Other Common Law Jurisdictions 
Judges in South Asia are among the most respected figures in 
government, and hence are sometimes called upon to take on very high 
profile nonjudicial tasks.
76
 A judge in Sri Lanka was recently appointed to 
 
 
 71. Emerton & Lee, supra note 6, at 410–12. 
 72. Wilson (1996) 189 CLR at 17–19. 
 73. See, e.g., Nthambelini Gabara, Judge Appointed to Probe Cricket SA Saga, ALLAFRICA 
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201111041280.html.  
 74. Denise Meyerson, Extra-Judicial Service on the Part of Judges: Constitutional Impediments 
in Australia and South Africa, 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 181, 181–82 (2003). 
 75. South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v. Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
 76. See Case Comment, MD Aftauddin v Bangladesh & Ors: Independent Judiciary-Consultation 
Required for Promotion of Judge to a Non-Judicial Post, 3 COMMONWEALTH HUM. RTS. L. DIG. 38 
(1996). 
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a cabinet post.
77
 Judges in India have headed the Press Council, a body 
that serves as a press watchdog, the Human Rights Panel of West 
Bengal,
78
 and the Competition Tribunal.
79
 They also routinely serve as 
heads of commissions of inquiry, including cases involving foreign policy, 
such as when a former Chief Justice was sent to investigate the change of 
power in the Maldives in 2012.
80
 In 2012, a retired Justice of the Supreme 
Court of India aroused controversy by engaging in an extensive debate in 
print over the merits of a decision in which he had been involved.
81 
Pakistan’s judiciary has likewise been involved in commissions 
investigating such matters as the causes and circumstances of the 1971 
civil war,
82
 the sheltering and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad,
83
 
and the murder of a journalist that had reported on Al-Qaeda.
84
 In one 
notable case, a two-judge panel of the Supreme Court of Pakistan heard 
corruption allegations against the Court itself, gave a verdict, and found 
the Court and its judges not guilty.
85 
In The Gambia, a Court of Appeal Judge was recently appointed as 
Attorney General and Minister of Justice.
86
 Other countries use judges 
regularly for commissions of inquiry.
87
  
 
 
 77. Quintus Perera, Justice L K Wimalachandra Appointed as Commissioner for Tourism, ASIAN 
TRIBUNE (Feb. 23, 2008), http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/9733. 
 78. Retd SC Judge to Head State HR Panel, TIMES OF INDIA (May 31, 2012), http://articles. 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-03-31/kolkata/31265952_1_retd-sc-judge-chief-justice-permanent-
judge. 
 79. See Introduction, COMPETITION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, compat.nic.in/introduction.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2013) (mentioning former justices). 
 80. Maneesh Chhibber, India Sent Former CJ to Probe Maldives Transfer of Power, INDIAN 
EXPRESS (May 22, 2012), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-sent-former-cj-to-probe-maldives 
-transfer-of-power/952108. 
 81. Arghya Sengupta, A Case for Judicial Lockjaw, HINDU (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.thehindu 
.com/opinion/lead/article2935696.ece (discussing case of Justice Kumar Ganguly). 
 82. Zafar Abbas, Pakistan Declassifies 1971 War Report, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1094788.stm. 
 83. Hanif Khalid, Abbottabad Commission Points Finger at PM, Others, NEWS INT’L (May 2, 
2012), http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-14305-Abbottabad-Commission-points-finger -
at-PM-others. 
 84. SALEEM SHAHZAD MURDER INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (Jan. 10, 
2012). 
 85. Qaiser Zulfiqar, Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar Case: Verdict Clears Court, Judges of Wrongdoing, 
EXPRESS TRIB. (June 15, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/394065/dr-arsalan-iftikhar-case-verdict-
clears-court-judges-of-wrongdoing/. 
 86. 6 More Cabinet Appointments, DAILY OBSERVER (Feb. 13, 2012), http://observer.gm/africa/ 
gambia/article/6-more-cabinet-appointments. 
 87. See, e.g., Cocaine Was Swapped Before Being Tendered in Court—Justice Dordzie 
Committee, GHANA NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.ghananewsagency.org/details/Social/ 
Cocaine-was-swapped-before-tendered-in-court-Justice-Dordzie-Committee/?ci=4&ai=37825. 
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H. France 
In France, nonjudicial functions by judges are regulated by statutory 
law, mainly the Code de l'organisation judiciaire and the Ordonnance n° 
58-1270 portant loi organique relative au statut de la magistrature.
88
 The 
enforcement of the appropriate rules is mainly left to the Judicial 
Council.
89
 According to French law, the exercise of judicial functions is 
incompatible with the exercise of all public functions and any other 
occupation or employment.
90
 Individual exemptions may, however, be 
granted to the judges by decision of the president of the court in which 
they work.
91
 These exemptions cover teaching and other functions or 
activities that do not harm independence.
92
 However, arbitration activities 
are excluded.
93
 Still, judges may without prior authorization engage in 
scientific, literary, or artistic work.
94
 
French judges are traditionally not known for becoming involved in 
nonjudicial roles, which is consistent with the local legal culture that has 
historically been based on a general distrust of the ―noblesse de robe.‖95 
The participation of judges and prosecutors, unlike in Germany or in Italy, 
is merely residual. 
I. Germany 
In Germany, there is a long tradition of judges serving in high profile 
nonjudicial functions. For example, Roman Herzog held the office of 
President of Germany (a largely ceremonial role) from 1994 to 1999 as a 
member of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
96
 Prior to 
 
 
 88. See Code de l'Organisation Judiciaire [Code for the Organization of the Judiciary] (Fr.), 
available at  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071164&date 
Texte=20080505; see also Ordonnance 58-1270 du 22 décembre 1958 portant loi organique relative au 
statut de la magistrature [Order 58-1270 of Dec. 22, 1958 concerning the Organic Law on the Status of 
the Judiciary], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE]  Dec. 23, 1958, p. 11551, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid 
Texte=LEGITEXT000006069212&dateTexte=20090320. 
 89. See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial 
Councils, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 53, 73–75 (2009) 
 90. See Ordonnance 58-1270, art. 8 (Fr.). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. ―Nobility of the robe,‖ referring to the hereditary judiciary in France before 1789. See 
Noblesse de Robe, BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/416997/noble 
sse-de-robe (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 96. Roman Herzog, BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/264038/ 
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this political office, Herzog served as a judge of the German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
97
 He was appointed to 
the federal court in 1983 and, from 1987 to 1994, he was the President of 
the Constitutional Court.
98
 He went straight from this post to the 
presidency of the country.
99
 
 In Germany, nonjudicial functions are generally regulated by statute. 
For example, a judge may act as chairman in conciliation agencies and in 
corresponding independent agencies pursuant to section 104, sentence 2 of 
the Federal Personnel Representation Act 
(Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz).
100
 A judge can additionally act as a 
conciliator in disputes between associations or between the associations 
and third parties.
101
 A judge may only be granted permission to act 
additionally as an arbitrator or give an expert opinion in arbitration 
proceedings when the parties to the arbitration agreement jointly designate 
her, or when she is appointed by an agency that is not a party to the 
proceeding.
102
 Such permission must be refused if, at the time of the 
decision regarding the granting of permission is made, the judge is seized 
of the case.
103
 Furthermore, ―a professor of law or of political science who 
has civil servant status and who is also a judge may draw up expert legal 
opinions and give legal advice with the permission of the highest public 
authority administering the courts. Such permission shall only be granted 
generally or in an individual case where the judicial activity of the 
professor does not exceed the scale of an additional activity and it is not to 
be feared that official interests are being impaired.‖104 A judge may 
―undertake research and give lessons at a scientific institution of higher 
education, at a public teaching institution, or at an official teaching 
institution and perform duties in matters concerned with examination.‖105 
Finally, statutory provision can be made to the effect that, where the 
situation in the labor market is such that there is an exceptional shortage of 
 
 
Roman-Herzog (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Bundespersonalvertretungsgesetz [BPersVG] [Federal Personnel Representation Act], Mar. 
15, 1974, BGBl. I at 693 (Ger.), available at JURIS. See also Deutsches Richtergesetz [DRiG] [German 
Judiciary Act], Apr. 19, 1972, BGBl. I at 713 (Ger.), § 4, available at JURIS (translation available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_drig/). 
 101. DRiG, § 40. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. § 41.  
 105. Id. § 4. 
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applicants and consequently an urgent public interest exists in employing 
larger numbers of candidates for the public service, a judge shall on 
application be granted unpaid leave for a duration of one to six years. 
During the period for which permission has been granted, he will refrain 
from engaging in paid additional activities and only engage in paid 
activities pursuant the law without infringing his official duties.
106
 Also, a 
judge shall be granted part-time employment up to half of normal service. 
The judge may undertake, during the period in which permission is 
granted, to enter into professional commitments outside his activities in 
the judiciary only to the extent to which the exercise of paid additional 
activities is permitted under section 71 of the Act read in conjunction with 
section 42 of the Federal Civil Servants Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz).
107
 
Clearly German judges face significant limitations on nonjudicial activity, 
but these are largely comparable to other civil servants. 
J. Other Civil Law Jurisdictions in Europe 
In Italy, nonjudicial functions are regulated by statute, in particular the 
law of judicial organization (ordinamento giudiziario). Most of the 
effective enforcement of the statute, however, is left to the Italian Judicial 
Council.
108
 For example, a judge may only be granted permission to act 
additionally as an arbitrator or give an expert opinion in arbitration 
proceedings by the Judicial Council (Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura).
109
 Furthermore, a judge may be in charge of the 
management in a public charity institution, but he is not allowed to receive 
any fees or remuneration.
110
 A judge may ―undertake research and give 
instruction at a scientific institution of higher education, at a public 
teaching institution, or at an official teaching institution and perform 
duties in matters concerned with examination.‖111 Some political functions 
are expressly allowed. To start, judges can serve in the Judicial Council. 
They can also be a senator or serve in the National Council.
112
 
There has been some involvement of the Italian judiciary in nonjudicial 
roles. To a large extent, the strict rules announced by statute are diluted by 
the practices of the Italian Judicial Council that grants permission for 
 
 
 106. Id. § 48b. 
 107. Id. § 76c. 
 108. Regio Decreto 30 gennaio 1941 n.12, art. 16 (It.).  
 109. Id. 
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many of these activities. Italian judges and prosecutors have been active in 
party politics and have served in the executive and legislative branches.
113
 
A similar observation can be made for Spain and Portugal. In both 
countries, nonjudicial functions are regulated by law (Estatuto dos 
Magistrados Judiciais in Portugal and Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial in 
Spain).
114
 These statutes broadly impede judges’ ability to serve in 
nonjudicial functions but also allow the local Judicial Council to make 
exceptions. In fact, these statutes tend to establish that serving judges shall 
not be appointed to judicial functions unrelated to the work of the courts 
without the authorization of the competent Judicial Council.
115
 The 
practice of these councils (dominated by judges) shapes the involvement 
of judges in nonjudicial roles.  
In Spain and Portugal, several judges have served in the executive 
branch, usually as Minister of Justice, heads of agencies within the 
Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Interior, or in committees of experts for 
legislative reforms. These situations broadly result from exceptions 
granted by the local judicial council. Judicial involvement in the 
legislative branch (as congressperson or senator) is less common.
116
 
K. Latin America 
In Latin America, judicial activities are defined by statute (Ley 
Orgánica del Poder Judicial in Argentina, Ley Orgánica Constitucional 
del Poder Judicial in Chile, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de la 
Federación in Mexico, Lei Orgânica da Magistratura Nacional in 
Brazil).
117
 These laws tend to be strict, but the practice varies with the 
political context and the role played by judicial councils. For example, in 
 
 
 113. David Nelken, The Judges and Political Corruption in Italy, 23 J.L. & SOC’Y 95 (1996), 
 114. Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais, Lei No. 21/85 de 19 de Julho de 1985, LEX INTEGRAL 
(Port.), available at http://www.verbojuridico.com/legisl/estatutos/emj.html; Ley Orgánica del Poder 
Judicial (B.O.E. 1985, 6) (Spain), available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/lo6-
1985.html 
 115. Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais, art. 13, § 1. 
 116. The most famous and emblematic case is that of Judge Baltasar Garzón, who was a junior 
minister. See, e.g., Giles Tremlett, Don Quixote—or a Superhero? Profile of Baltasar Garzón, 
OBSERVER (U.K.) (Oct. 18, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/19/spain-franco. 
 117. Law No. 5827, July 13, 1955, B.O. 12-07-55 (Arg.), available at http://www.gob 
.gba.gov.ar/legislacion/legislacion/l-5827.html; CÓDIGO ORGÁNICO DE TRIBUNALES [CÓD. ORG. 
TRIB.] [Judiciary Code] (Chile), available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=25563; Ley 
Orgánica del Poder Judicial de la Federación [LOPJF][Enabling Law for the Federal Judiciary], Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DO] 26 de mayo de 1995 (Mex.), available at http://www.cem.itesm.mx/ 
derecho/nlegislacion/federal/184/index.html; Lei Complementar No. 35, de 14 de Março de 1979, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 14.03.1979 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ 
ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp35.htm. 
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Mexico, judges are only allowed to engage in nonjudicial functions if 
honorary and not remunerated.
118
 Still, involvement in political or quasi-
political activities is managed by the Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de 
la Judicatura Federal).
119
 In particular, the role of the Electoral Court, 
where judges can challenge the results of federal elections of legislators 
and the president, has been controversial .
120
 
An identical situation is found in Argentina. The role of the judicial 
council (Consejo de la Magistratura) and of the Supreme Court has been 
significant in expanding nonjudicial functions in an environment with 
strict statututory rules. Some judges have been famous for performing 
seemingly executive functions, such as Judge Norberto Oyarbide, who has 
served in prominent investigative roles.
121
 At the same time, judges 
investigating political figures have been removed by the judicial bodies in 
a politicized environment.
122
  
Brazil is no different. The recently created judicial council (Conselho 
Nacional de Justiça) has struggled with effectively limiting nonjudicial 
functions, corruption, and nepotism.
123
 Although judges cannot participate 
in politics,
124
 they have an important role. Judicial associations are very 
active and shape relevant areas of public policy; judges can be involved 
with associations but cannot be remunerated.
125
 
Chile follows a similar pattern. Of particular note, judges can defend 
themselves in personal lawsuits or lawsuits against their wives, husbands, 
ascendants, descendants, siblings, or pupils.
126
 
 
 
 118. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 101  (―The Ministers of 
the Supreme Court of Justice, the Circuit Magistrates, the District Judges, the respective secretaries, 
and the Councilors of the Federal Judicature, as well as the Magistrates of the Superior Chamber of the 
Electoral Tribunal, may not, in any case, accept or perform office [empleo] or responsibility [encargo] 
of the Federation, of the States, of the Federal District or of individuals [particulares], except for those 
non-remunerative offices [cargos] in scientific, educational, literary or charitable associations.‖). 
 119. Id. 
 120. C.P., art. 98 (Mex.) (describing role of judges in Electoral Tribunal). 
 121. Oyarbide, molesto con la Policía por las versiones del hallazgo del explosivo, LA RAZON 
(May 23, 2012), http://www.larazon.com.ar/actualidad/Oyarbide-Policia-versiones-hallazgo-explosivo 
_0_352800155.html (Judge Norberto Oyarbide investigated the alleged conspiracy to kill Colombian 
Former President Alvaro Uribe). 
 122. Paz Rodriguez Niell, Apartan al juez Rafecas de la causa que involucra a Boudou, LA 
NACIÓN (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1468623-apartan-al-juez-rafecas-de-la-causa-
que-involucra-a-boudou. 
 123. Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 99 (Braz.).  
 124. C.F., art. 95.  
 125. Lei Complementar No. 35, art. 36, de 14 de Março de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 14.03.1979 (Braz.). 
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Latin American jurisdictions are similar to European civil law 
countries in the way they approach judicial involvement with nonjudicial 
functions. Strict statututory laws mix with a more flexible practice derived 
from the influence of local judicial councils or the Supreme Court. 
Corruption seems to be more of an issue in this context than in Europe.
127
 
A special note should be made of the Bolivian case. In 2005, the 
President and Vice-President of Bolivia were forced to resign because of 
mass protests, and the Chief Justice became interim President. He presided 
over elections, leading to the historic election of President Evo Morales. 
Yet shortly afterwards, Congress attempted to impeach the new Chief 
Justice because of clashes with President Morales.
128
 There is, it seems, a 
real risk of politicization that comes from nonjudicial functions of a 
certain type. 
L. China 
Nonjudicial functions in People’s Republic of China (PRC) are 
regulated by statute, in particular the Judges Law of the PRC 
(中华人民共和国法官法).129 Article 14 is quite clear: ―The judges cannot 
serve concurrently as members of the Standing Committee of China’s 
National People’s Congress; or serve concurrently in the agencies, 
procuratorate organs, the enterprises and the institutions; or serve 
concurrently as lawyers.‖130 Article 14 adds that ―judges cannot act as 
lawyers, as agents ad litem or defense counsel in two years after their 
departure from the court.‖131 So clearly PRC judges are quite limited in 
their ability to pursue nonjudicial functions. In fact, the PRC Supreme 
Court has published a notice prohibiting in-service judges from acting as 
arbitrators (关于现职法官不得担任仲裁员的通知). Published in 2004, the 
 
 
 127. EDUARDO BUSCAGLIA, CORRUPTION AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (1996). 
 128. Martin Arostegui, Bolivian Chief Justice Faces Impeachment Trial, WASH. TIMES (May 22, 
2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/22/top-judge-faces-impeachment-trial-in-senate 
/?page=all. 
 129. (中华人民共和国法官法) [Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995), http://en.china 
court.org/public/detail.php?id=2692 (China). 
 130. Id. art. 14. 
 131. Id. See also (中华人民共和国律师法) [Law on Lawyers] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., May 15, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997), art. 41 (―A lawyer who once served as a 
judge or prosecutor shall not act as an agent ad litem or defender within two years after leaving his 
post in the people’s court or the people’s procuratorate.‖). 
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notice rules that any in-service judge should quit from the position of 
arbitrator within one month.
132
  
In the PRC, there are a few exceptions that reflect some of the 
possibilities we have discussed. The Code of Judicial Ethics of the PRC 
states the following rule: 
Rule 44: A judge may participate in academic research and other 
social activities which are helpful in promoting judicial construction 
and judicial reform. However, these activities should be in 
compliance with the law, construct no obstruction to judicial 
impartiality and the preservation of judicial authority and will not 
conflict with the judge's judicial function.
133
 
Finally, the involvement of the Chinese judiciary in the administration of 
the courts has been regulated by the Judges Law of the PRC, article 6. 
This rule states that ―Presidents, vice presidents, members of judicial 
committees, chief judges, associate chief judges of divisions shall, in 
addition to the judicial functions and duties, perform other functions and 
duties commensurate with their posts.‖134  
It is apparent that nonjudicial functions in the PRC are quite limited by 
a third-party regulation. One possible explanation is that the Chinese 
judiciary does not have the political influence or prestige to relax these 
regulations. Supply and demand of nonjudicial functions seem weak in an 
environment where the judiciary faces other significant challenges, not 
least of which is corruption. As institutional reform takes place in the PRC 
and courts become more independent and less corrupt, we could see a shift 
in demand for nonjudicial functions that might challenge the current strict 
regulations. However, such a shift seems a long way off at the moment. 
M. The Philippines 
Non-judicial functions were also at the center of a major controversy 
regarding the judiciary in the Philippines. In 1984, Ferdinand Marcos 
created a Judiciary Development Fund (JDF), funded with court fees and 
 
 
 132. See 最高人民法院:现职法官不得担任仲裁员 [Supreme Court: Serving Judge Shall Not Act as 
Arbitrator], CHINACOURT.ORG (July 7, 2004), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2004/07/id/125 
571.shtml (Chinese). 
 133. Code of Judicial Ethics for Judges of the People’s Republic of China rule 44, as translated in 
James Spigelman, Convergence and the Judicial Role: Recent Developments in China, 55 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 57, 70 (2003). 
 134.  Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 6. 
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bar exam fees, to supplement the budget of the judiciary.
135
 The JDF was 
administered by the Supreme Court and was to contribute 80% of its 
distributions to employee salaries with the rest going to facilities.
136
 A 
group of disgruntled court staff complained that their salaries were too 
low, and got a congressman interested in their case.
137
 After the court 
refused to provide him with information, the congressman accused the 
chief justice of illegal use of public funds. The court reacted quite 
defensively.
138
 
An independent investigation found very lax oversight over use of the 
JDF funds. The congressman then responded with an impeachment 
complaint that resulted in several months of hearings. Before the 
complaint could be transmitted to the Senate, the court stepped in, 
declaring the impeachment complaint unconstitutional, and enjoining the 
House and Senate from acting on it.
139
 The court relied on a constitutional 
provision stating that no impeachment proceeding could be initiated twice 
within one year against the same official.
140
 Another complaint against the 
chief justice had just been dismissed.  
Administrative responsibilities of managing budgets and personnel are 
clearly nonjudicial in nature, yet proponents of judicial independence often 
argue that they must be placed with the courts themselves.
141
 The 
Philippine example illustrates some of the dangers of this approach. By 
burdening courts with tasks in which they have no comparative advantage, 
there is a risk that courts will perform the job poorly, exposing them to 
criticism and controversy. 
In the late 2000s, Chief Justice Reynato Puno of the Supreme Court of 
the Philippines began to be solicited by many to run for president in 
2010.
142
 In 2009, he met with government officials to discuss his leading a 
―transition council,‖ a way to ease President Arroyo out of power. This 
proposed body would amend the constitution to fix various problems in 
the political system, heightened due to feared technical problems with the 
 
 
 135. Presidential Decree Establishing a Judiciary Development Fund and for Other Purposes, Pres. 
Dec. No. 1949 (1984) (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecreeno1949 
.htm#.UVOR8BzvuSo. 
 136. Id.  
 137. VITUG, supra note 2, at 61–73. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 80–81. 
 140. CONST. (1987) art. XI, sec. 3(5) (Phil.). 
 141. See, e.g., Shimon Shetreet, The Emerging Transnational Jurisprudence on Judicial 
Independence: The IBA Standards and Montreal Declaration, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 393 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985). 
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elections.
143
 When exposed, this led to significant controversy, pressures 
to resign, and accusations that the Chief Justice had badly overstepped the 
proper role of the judge. 
CONCLUSION 
If judges are doing their job well, there will be opportunities for them 
to become involved in functions outside the courtroom. We have 
articulated a positive theory of such judicial involvement in nonjudicial 
functions, emphasizing the interaction of demand (why judges want to 
perform such roles) and supply (why political and social actors want 
judges in nonjudicial functions). In this context, the interaction of supply 
and demand may create a potential market failure due to external costs and 
the possibility of demand-induced supply. As a consequence, some 
regulation is appropriate. Self-regulation seems ineffective given the 
likelihood of capture. Most legal systems seem to take an approach 
consistent with our theory, limiting judicial involvement in some way. But 
the range of regulatory approaches is fairly broad, suggesting that there is 
no universal optimum.  
We do not, in this Article, wrestle with normative questions, in part 
because we do not start with an essentialist view of the judicial role. We 
recognize that such roles have evolved over time and are likely to continue 
to evolve. Role conceptions differ dramatically across countries as well. 
Our empirical survey has shown, though, that there has been a trend 
toward expansion of the ambit of judicial decision-making and roles in 
many different traditions. 
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